William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 4

Article 4

2000

Land Claims of the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe:
Are They "Holding Hostages" or Asserting Valid
Property Rights?
Michael D. Beach

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Beach, Michael D. (2000) "Land Claims of the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe: Are They "Holding Hostages" or Asserting Valid
Property Rights?," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 4, Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Beach: Land Claims of the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe: Are They "Holdin

LAND CLAIMS OF THE GOLDEN HILL PAUGUSSETT
TRIBE: ARE THEY "HOLDING HOSTAGES" OR
ASSERTING VALID PROPERTY RIGHTS?
Michael D. Beacht
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1009
II.

THE TRIBE HAS A VIABLE FEDERAL CLAIM FOR

PO SSESSIO N .......................................................................... 1015

A. The Proclamationof 1763 Has Legal Force..................... 1015
B. The PaugussettsHave a Federal Common-Law Claim ...... 1017
C. Negative Implications ofJudge Dorsey's Opinion.............. 1023
III.

CONNECTICUT BEARS THE INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN OF

PROVING THAT THE TRIBE'S TITLE WAS VALIDLY
EXTINGUISH ED ..................................................................... 1024

Initial Questions ........................................................
Status of the Title, 1659-1761 ......................................
Status of the Title, 1761-1765 ......................................
Status of the Title, 1775-1789 ......................................
1. American Independence..........................................
2. After 1775 and Before 1789 ....................................
3. 1789 and Beyond ..................................................
E. Learningfrom the Past................................................
A.
B.
C.
D.

1024
1025
1029
1034
1034
1035
1038
1039

IV . C ONCLUSIO N ........................................................................ 1042
I. INTRODUCTION

For years, the real estate market in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
has been in disarray as a result of land claims brought in the
Connecticut state and federal courts by the Golden Hill Paugussett
Tribe.' On May 9, 1997, the Superior Court of Connecticut
dismissed the tribe's state court claims by finding that the tribe

t
Associate in the Environmental Group at Faegre & Benson, L.L.P.,
Minneapolis; J.D., 1997, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1994, Carleton College. The
author would like to thank Professor Joseph William Singer for the idea for this
article and his invaluable assistance.
1. See Indians'LandSuits DragAlong, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at 2.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

1

1010

William
Mitchell LawMITCHELL
Review, Vol. 26,LAW
Iss. 4 [2000],
Art. 4
WILLIAM
REVIEW

[Vol. 26:4

lacked standing,' and in September 1996, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) initially denied the tribe federal recognition.' These
two setbacks prompted Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Elemental to proclaim that the tribe's efforts to "hold hostage the
property owners" of Bridgeport, Connecticut, had come to an end.4
Attorney General Blumenthal's statement, however, would seem to
reflect an ignorance of, and perhaps even disrespect for, the nature
of aboriginal land claims. More significantly, it was presumptuous
since the tribe's federal court action still is pending, and the BIA
recently reopened the tribe's petition for federal recognition. 6 The
controversy thus is a live issue once again.
The Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Connecticut is a staterecognized Indian tribe with reservations in Trumbull and

2. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Town of Trumbull, No. CV
9303067025, 1997 WL 263711, at *3 (Conn. May 9, 1997); Golden Hill Paugussett
Tribe v. Town of Seymour, No. CV 930443665, 1997 WL 255278, at *3 (Conn. May
9, 1997); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Town of Shelton, No. CV 930441485,
1997 WL 257577, at *3 (Conn. May 9, 1997); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Town
of Southbury, 651 A.2d 1246, 1255 (Conn. 1995). The tribe's appeals were
unsuccessful and the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to review further any of
the state court issues, which, in effect, now have been finally adjudicated in favor
of the state. See Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Tribe's Appeal, Assoc. PRESS STATE AND
LOCAL WIRE,

Oct. 3, 1998.

3. See Notice of Final Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,501-02 (1996). The
tribe appealed this denial to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which affirmed
the BIA's decision subject to a supplemental proceeding in which the tribe could
submit documents received from a Freedom of Information Act Request to the
state made by the BIA. See In re Federal Acknowledgement of the Golden Hill
Paugussett Tribe, 32 IBIA 216, 220-24 (1998). After the supplemental proceeding,
the Interior Board of Indian Appeals again affirmed the BIA's decision, and then
referred the matter to the Secretary of the Interior.
See In re Federal
Acknowledgement of the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 33 IBIA 4, 4 (1998).
Secretary Babbitt subsequently asked the BIA to reconsider five areas of the tribe's
petition in December 1998, after which the BIA placed the tribe's petition on full
active consideration on May 24, 1999. See Denise Lavoie, Paugussetts Win Another
Chance In Bid For FederalRecognition, Assoc. PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, May 25,
1999, at 1; Decision Delayed On Paugussett Tribe's Bid For Federal Recognition, Assoc.
PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Apr. 26, 1999, at 1.
4. See Lyn Bixby, Court Rules Against Paugussetts Over Land Claims in
Connecticut, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 13, 1997, at A6; see also Lyn Bixby, U.S.
Asked to Stop Tribe Recognition, Blumenthal's ProposalPromptly Assailed in Washington,
THE HARTFORD COURANT,

June 8, 2000, at A3.

5.

See Lyn Bixby, Land Feud Felt Beyond 3 Towns Mashantucket Case Spurs
Changes in U.S. Rules, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 24, 1999, at Al.
6. See Court Ruling Favors Tribe, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 10, 1999, at
A4; State Appeals Decision to Review Tribe's Status, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, July 1, 1999,
at 6.
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Colchester, Connecticut.7 The tribe first filed suit against the state
of Connecticut in federal court in 1993. The tribe argued pursuant
to the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 17908 and the British Royal
Proclamation of 1763, 9 that the original title to eighty-eight acres of
land in Bridgeport, Connecticut, remained vested with the Golden
Hill Paugussetts.' ° The tribe claimed that its 1765 "conveyance" of
sixty-eight of the eighty-eight acres to the state was void under the
law prevailing at that time." The tribe also claimed that 1802 and
1854 conveyances of the remaining twenty acres were void 1
because the conveyances violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act
of 1790.1'
On July 21, 1993,Judge Peter Dorsey, U.S. District CourtJudge
for the District of
Connecticut, granted defendants' motion to
S 14
dismiss both claims. Judge Dorsey decided that the tribe's claims
under the Non-Intercourse Act' regarding the twenty acres should
be dismissed without prejudice because the tribe had failed to6
exhaust administrative remedies on the issue of standing.
Specifically, Judge Dorsey noted that the tribe's application to the
BIA for federal recognition had not been fully adjudicated. 7 The
court then held that the tribe's claim under the Proclamation of
1763 to the other sixty-eight of the eighty-eight acres could not be
heard in federal court since the claim did not arise "under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 8 The court
7. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-59a (West 1999) (stating that the "state of
Connecticut further recognizes that... the Golden Hill Paugussett [is a] selfgoverning entit[y] possessing powers and duties over tribal members and
reservations").
8. See Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, ch.33, 1 Stat. 137 (expired
1793) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)).
9.

See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HIsToRY 47-50

(8th ed. 1968).
10. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1994);
Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 132 (D. Conn. 1993).
11. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 132.
12. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 132 (dismissing the Tribe's claim that the land
was sold in violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act).
13. See Trade and Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177.
14. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 139.
15. See Trade and Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177.
16. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 135.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 136 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1994)). The court determined
that since the tribe's claim that the 68-acre conveyance violated the British Royal
Proclamation of 1763-a royal proclamation made pursuant to British law-the
federal district court did not have jurisdiction. See id. at 137-39 (ultimately finding
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proceeded to dismiss that claim with prejudice.' 9
The tribe appealed the dismissal of its Non-Intercourse Act
claims to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 20 The Second
Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing these claims,
ruling that the district court should have stayed proceedings on
those claims until there had been an administrative adjudication by
the BIA regarding the tribe's eligibility for federal recognition.
The Second Circuit held that once the BIA adjudicates the tribe's
administrative claim, the federal district court then may determine
the tribe's standing to sue under the Non-Intercourse Act with
22
guidance from the BIA's determination.
The district court's
ruling regarding the sixty-eight acres and the actionability of a
claim under the Proclamation of 1763 was not appealed by the
tribe, however.
Curiously, the District Court of Connecticut subsequendy
dismissed the remainder of the tribe's federal lawsuit in 1997apparently in light of the BIA's initial 1996 denial of the Golden
Hill Paugussett's application for federal recognition 3-then
reversed itself.24 Implied in the 1997 decision and Judge Dorsey's
1993 opinion is the erroneous assumption that a lack of federal
recognition is fatal to the tribe's standing to sue under the Non26
25
to regain possession of the twenty acres.
Intercourse Act
that the federal court "does not have jurisdiction over the claims based on the
Proclamation of 1763").
19. See id. at 139.
20. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994).
21. See 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1994) (setting forth "Procedures for Establishing that
an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe").
22. See Weicker, 39 F.3d at 60.
23. See Notice of Final Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,501-02 (1996).
24. See Lyn Bixby, Judge Dismisses Paugussett Claims, THE HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 17, 1998, at A5. Judge Dorsey's retreat from his original dismissal is referred
to in Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, June 10, 1998, at 12A.
25. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 133.
26. As to these 20 acres, the tribe alleges that they were taken in violation of
the Non-Intercourse Act. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 132. In the event that the
tribe was to have standing, a suit claiming an invalid taking of original Indian title
under the Non-Intercourse Act seems like a "slam-dunk." The district court in its
factual summary actually noted that "[a]n act of the Connecticut General
Assembly in 1802 purported to sell the Nimrod lot (12 acres) and the Rocky Hill
lot (eight acres) on behalf of the tribe without the consent or approval of the
United States." Id. at 132. However, eight of the 20 acres were given to the tribe
under the allegedly invalid 1765 agreement. See id. Therefore, were the tribe to
prevail on the claim to the other 68 acres, its claims under the Non-Intercourse
Act presumably would be reduced to the 12 acres remaining from the 1650
reservation.
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Demonstrating
that this assumption is flawed would be simple and
•
27
straightforward.
The most obvious route for this paper to take,
therefore, would be to illuminate the well-supported fact that even
if the tribe were to be defeated in its quest for federal recognition,
such a defeat would not spell the demise of its claim under the
Non-Intercourse Act-the Golden Hill Paugussetts have standing to
sue under the Act as a state-recognized tribe.2 s
Instead, it is the intent of this paper to further rekindle this
controversy-a burning issue to many in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
and its surroundings2-by arguing that the never-appealed claim
for the sixty-eight acres of land taken in 1765 should not have been
dismissed. Moreover, it will be proposed that this claim would be
27. SeeJoint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,
377-78 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that existence of the tribe before American
independence and state recognition suggest it is a tribe protected by the NonIntercourse Act). Even if the tribe were denied federal recognition, it would not
lack standing to sue, especially in light of its state-recognized status. The district
court attempted to distinguish Morton by claiming, mysteriously, that the state had
not stipulated that the Paugussetts were a tribe. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 133.
This flies in the face of the fact that the tribe is recognized in a state statute and
relies on a misreading of Morton. The tribe in Morton also was not federally
recognized; but the court held that the tribe was protected by the Non-Intercourse
Act. See Morton, 528 F.2d at 377-78.
28. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 133 ("It has been held that recognition of
tribal status is not required for a tribe to be able to invoke the Non-Intercourse
Act."); see also Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.
Mass. 1977) (noting that tribal status absent federal recognition is an adjudicative
fact); Narragansett Tribe v. S.R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 808 (D. R.I.
1976) (rejecting argument that only federally recognized tribes are protected by
Non-Intercourse Act); Mohegan Tribe v. State, CV No. H-77-434, Ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 1984) (holding that the
absence of federal recognition is not conclusive). The court in Morton discussed at
length the policy and purpose of the Non-Intercourse Act, concluding that "there
is nothing in the Act to suggest that 'tribe' is to be read to exclude a bona fide
tribe not otherwise federally recognized." Morton, 528 F.2d at 377. The court stated
that the policy of the Act was to "protect Indian tribes' right of occupancy, even
when that right is unrecognized by any treaty." Id. The purpose of the Act is to
prevent "unfair, improvident or improper disposition of Indian lands." Id. The
court further supported this conclusion with evidence that the Passamaquoddy
tribe historically has been recognized by the state. See id. at 377-78.
29. See generally Appeals Court Rules Against Land Claims, 10 THE OJIBwE NEWS
44, Aug. 14, 1998; Lyn Bixby, Indian Groups' Fortunes to be Decided this Year, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 2, 2000, at A5; Lyn Bixby, Land Feud Felt Beyond 3 Towns
Mashantucket Case Spurs Changes in U.S. Rules, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 24,

1999, at Al; Lyn Bixby, Another Tribe in State Seeks Federal Status, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 8, 1998, at B1; Court Ruling Favors Tribe, THE HARTFORD COURANT,
Aug. 10, 1999, at A4; In Other Capitols,Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 2, 1998; Denise LaVoie,
Indian Tribe Makes Conn. Land Claim, Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 16, 1998; Small Victory for
Paugussetts,THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 25, 1999, at B7.
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successful if relitigated under federal common-law rather than as a
claim under the Proclamation of 1763. It is my determination that
such a federal common-law claim should "survive" claim preclusion
since it never was adjudicated on its merits.
This paper will thus argue: (1) if the law is to be applied
consistently to Indians and non-Indians, Judge Dorsey's ruling that
aboriginal land claims cannot predate American Independence
must be refuted; and (2) had Judge Dorsey properly applied
federal Indian law, he would have found that the tribe's title to the
sixty-eight acres was not validly taken in 1765 or any time
thereafter.
Accordingly, Part II will critique Judge Dorsey's opinion
regarding the sixty-eight acres on a normative and philosophical
level, highlighting the fundamentally erroneous assumptions on
which the opinion is based and deploring its implications. The
goal of this argument is to foster a better appreciation of the
legitimacy of the tribe's claim.
The third and more significant part of this paper will trace the
history of the tribe's title and argue that the State of Connecticut
and other defendants bear the heavy burden of proving that title to
the sixty-eight acres is not currently vested in the tribe. A review of
the historical evidence and the applicable law indicates that this
burden is insurmountable.
Finally, Part IV very briefly will discuss res judicata issues that
could arise in the event that the tribe does reinitiate its claim to the
sixty-eight acres. The conclusion also will offer a practical solution
to the resulting land crisis that recognizes the interests of all
parties.
The underlying theme of this paper is that the arguments
typically made by opponents of Indian land claims are shortsighted. Many people assume that 200-year-old land claims should
be dead and buried with our Anglo-American ancestors whose
unlawful actions spawned such claims, and that Indians, as a
"conquered" people, should have no right to assert ownership of
ancestral lands in the year 2000.
However, our colonial
predecessors, perhaps in an effort to ease their consciences and
cloak their actions in an aura of legitimacy, implemented a legal
framework centuries ago to govern the taking of American Indians'
title to ancestral lands.
Despite the fact that many American
30.

For example, in 1763, the British colonial government issued the
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Indians never willingly subjected themselves to this common law,
that body of legal rules and principles nevertheless placed certain
constraints on the sovereign's ability to dispossess tribes of their
ancestral lands."' In some measure, therefore, American Indian
property rights have been recognized for as long as AngloAmerican property rights. American Indian property rights should
have been, and should continue to be, entitled to the same
protections. With that in mind, my argument that Judge Dorsey
has misapplied federal Indian-law principles is discussed first.
II. THE TRIBE HAS

A VIABLE FEDERAL COMMON-LAW CLAIM FOR

POSSESSION

Judge Dorsey initially suggests that the Proclamation of 1763
was not intended to apply east of the Appalachian Mountains and1 2
thus, to lands such as the Golden Hill Paugussett reservation.
Although the argument itself seems highly spurious,33 Judge Dorsey
nevertheless determines that "it will be assumed, without deciding,
that the territory named in the complaint falls within the
Proclamation. " 3
A.

The Proclamationof 1763 Has Legal Force

Judge Dorsey insists that royal proclamations are not law and
that they have not had "the force of Acts of Parliament since

Proclamation of 1763, which managed Indian affairs in the thirteen colonies and
directly addressed the issue of Indian property rights. See Robert N. Clinton, The
Proclamationof 1763: Colonial Prelude To Two Centuries Of Federal-State Conflict Over
The Management Of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REv. 329, 329-30 (1989) (discussing
governmental management of Indian property rights before and after the
Proclamation of 1763).
31. See id. at 355-57 (listing various restrictions imposed by the Proclamation
of 1763 on the ability to transfer title to land where Indian property rights were
involved).
32. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 135.
33. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 616 (1st Cir. 1981)
(clarifying that the Continental Congress' policy in 1783 "affirmed the prior policy
of the Royal Proclamation of 1763... but it limited the effect of the Resolve [of
1783] to lands 'without the limits ofjurisdiction' of the states"); see also Robert N.
Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1055, 1091 (1995)
("Thus, even for lands eastward of the Indian country boundary, i.e., lands clearly
lying within domains claimed for settlement by colonial charter, the Proclamation
centralized the process of securing Indian land sessions [sic] by handing that
responsibility to officials appointed by and answerable to London.").
34. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 136.
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1547.' ', 5 However, dealings between the British Empire and
American Indians were deemed nation-to-nation interactions36 and
were handled exclusively by the executive branch of the British
government. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled as a matter of law
that, "[a]ccording to the theory of the British constitution, the
royal prerogative is very extensive, so far as respects the political
relations between Great Britain and foreign nations. 37 The British
believed that the Indians' "friendship should be secured by
quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by
restraining the encroachments of whites; and the power to38do this
was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the crown.
New land was discovered in the name of the king, not in the
name of Parliament, and the right of preemption (the right to
negotiate for the Indians' right of possession), which was granted
exclusively
to
S
39 the discovering sovereign, was vested in the king, not
Parliament. It was within the king's discretion to grant this right
35. See id.
36. See Clinton, supra note 30, at 335-36. Referring to the famous Mohegan
Indian land controversy, Clinton notes that a preliminary ruling of a royal
commission asserted Crown authority over Indian relations because of the nationto-nation character of the relationship:
The royal commission rejected [the colonies'] attack on its jurisdiction:
Commissioner Daniel Horsmanden of New York held, over one dissent,
that the Indian tribes within colonial boundaries were distinct peoples
subject neither to the laws of England nor of colonial courts. He argued
that a land dispute between such a distinct people and English subjects
must be determined by the law of nature and of nations and that hearing
such international disputes was the province of royal commissions, not of
local courts. The tribes and their members owed no allegiance to local
laws or local courts....
The Mohegan case initiated increased
centralization of oversight and control of colonial Indian regulation by
the British government.
Id. The record of the Mohegan Land Controversy and the commission's ruling to
which Clinton refers is cited as: GOVERNMENT AND COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT AND
MOHEGAN INDIANS BY THEIR GUARDIANS, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF

REVIEw IN

1743 [hereinafter

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF REVIEW].

37. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 596-97 (1823).
38. Id. at 597.
39. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 748 (1835) ("The authority of
the proclamation is in the right of the king to legislate over a conquered country,
which as Lord Mansfield says, was never denied in Westminster Hall, or questioned
in parliament."); see also FRANCISJENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA 107 (1975)
("The language of these [colonial] charters, it is nothing new to say, was feudal
through and through .... [T]hese dominions would be supervised by the Privy
Council instead of Parliament. [T]he direct tie of vassalage between the colonial
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of preemption to colonists at the same time he granted fee title to
lands in such charters as that of the Colony of Connecticut in
1662. 40 It also, therefore, was within his discretion to reassert
preemption
rights over those lands reserved for the Indians in
41
1763.
The fact that the proclamation was unpopular and, as Judge
Dorsey states, "generally ignored,"4 2 does not diminish its legal
status.43 Our courts would hardly deem an Executive Order or
treaty to be invalid simply because
it was ignored or unpopular. As
S44
the court in Mitchel v. United States, put it:
The principles which had been established in the colonies
were adopted by the king, in the proclamation of October
1763, and applied to the provinces acquired by the treaty
of peace, and the crown lands in the royal provinces, now
composing the United States, as the law which should govern the
enjoyment and transmissionof Indian and vacant lands.
B.

The PaugussettsHave a Federal Common-Law Claim

Judge Dorsey concludes his opinion on this issue as follows:
"Whether title dating from the Proclamation of 1763 will be
recognized is a different question from whether a party may sue in46
federal court to remedy a wrong prohibited by the Proclamation.,
This language is misleading. The alleged wrong prohibited by the
Proclamation was the 1765 taking of the sixty-eight acres without
consent of the Crown.4 v The tribe arguably may not have plead its
claims in the most appropriate fashion and the Proclamation of
lord and the king was so clearly understood that Parliament refrained from
interposing its own authority except during the Commonwealth, when Parliament
substituted itself for the king.").
40.

See THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 1 (1808)

(containing a copy of the 1662 charter of the colony of Connecticut) [hereinafter
1808 LAws].
41.

See Clinton, supra note 30, at 334 ("While management of British-Indian

relations was left primarily to local colonial authorities, the British Crown always
reserved the right of oversight.").
42. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 137 (D. Conn.
1993).
43. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 597.
44. 34 U.S. 711 (1835)
45.

Id. at 746-47 (emphasis added).

46. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 138.
47. See id. at 135 (citing plaintiff's allegation that the alienation of the 68
acres from the tribe in 1765 violated the Proclamation of 1763).
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1763, standing alone, may not provide a cause of action under U.S.
laws. The Proclamation's mandate, however, undoubtedly affected
common-law property rights in 1763. 4
Furthermore, the tribe is not seeking the legal "remedy" of
compensation for the invalid taking of original Indian title.49
Rather, the tribe asserts that its right of occupancy never was
properly extinguished and remains valid today.5 ° So, the question
posed by this case is precisely whether title dating from 1763 will be
recognized, and not, as the court characterizes it, whether the
Proclamation of 1763 creates a cause of action for damages in
federal court.
The Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe had title to the disputed
sixty-eight acres in 1763, 51 and federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction to decide whether that title remains with the tribe in
2000. The district court in this case was merely being asked to
determine whether the actions of the State of Connecticut in 1765,
under the prevailing common law of the time, including, inter alia
the Proclamation of 1763, were legally valid and whether those
52
actions had any effect on the tribe's right of occupancy. As Judge
Dorsey acknowledged, the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v.
M'Intosh53 rendered a decision in 1823 regarding ownership of a
54

In so
parcel of land by interpreting the prevailing law in 1773.
doing, Justice Marshall declared "invalid two private purchases of
Indian land that occurred without the Crown's consent., 55 The
Proclamation of 1763 was valid law, and was declared as such by the
Johnson Court: "The authority of this proclamation, so far as it
48. See Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. 425, 456 (1799).
49. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 132.
50. See id.
51. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 367-68 (May 19, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood
& Brainard Co. 1881) (noting that the General Assembly in May of 1765
acknowledged that white encroachment on the Golden Hill Reservation had
"unjustly disseized" the Paugussett of their land).
52. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 74849 (1835) (holding that
"[t]he proclamation of October 1763, then, must be taken to be the law of the
Floridas till their cession by Great Britain to Spain in 1783, superseding during
that period the laws of Spain which had been before in force in those provinces, so
far as they were repugnant; and according to the established principles of the laws
of nations, the laws of a conquered or ceded country remain in force till altered by
the new sovereign. The inhabitants thereof also retain all rights ......
53. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
54. See id. at 599; see also Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 138.
55. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 235 (1985)
(explainingJohnson).
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respected this continent, has never been denied, and the titles it gave
to the lands have always been sustained in our courts.

56

All that the

tribe seeks in this case is a determination of who legally owns the
sixty-eight acres in question in light of the prevailing law in 1765
and thereafter.
The Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe was not, and is not, required
to cite any particular statute or royal proclamation for its claim to
be actionable. 5 8 The U.S. Supreme Court asserted that tribes can
bring 59federal common-law claims for original Indian title in federal
court.
For example, the tribe can seek what amounts to a
declaratory judgment as to who legally owns the sixty-eight acres
under federal common law.6°
The tribe also is not required to have retained de facto
possession of the land through the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution. 6' Despite losing actual possession prior to American
Independence,
the tribe is not barred from claiming title in federal
62
court.

To argue otherwise would be to suggest that at the

moment of constitutional ratification in 1789, all persons currently
in physical possession of land received legal title to that land. This
never has been a principle of American law. 63 The U.S. Supreme
Court in Johnson held that if title is to be recognized by the
American courts, simply demonstrating possession from 1789 to

56. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 597.
57. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 132.
58. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) ("Nor
is it true, as respondent urges, that a tribal claim to any particular lands must be
based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal government action."); Cayuga Indian
Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1319 (D. Conn. 1983) ("It appears to have
been simply assumed that title to land necessarily included the ability to assert
ownership rights in a court of proper jurisdiction, for '[h]ow can it be said to be
any title at all which cannot be asserted in a court ofjustice by the owner to defend
or obtain possession."') (quoting Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 11 (1823)).
59. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 235 ("Numerous decisions of this Court prior to
Oneida I recognized at least implicitly that Indians have a federal common-law
right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights.").
60. See id.
61. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 243-46
(1941) (holding that statutes of limitation, laches and other equitable doctrines
such as adverse possession do not apply to claims of original Indian title).
62. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597 (1853).
63. See Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 487 (1901) (citing Astiazaran v. Santa
Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U.S. 80, 81 (1893) for the proposition that as to titles
held in the Mexican Government prior to the United States assuming control
under the treaty, "private rights of property within the ceded territory
undoubtedly were not affected by the change of sovereignty and jurisdiction").
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the present is insufficient because proper title must be continuous
from the moment the land was acquired. 64
The Oneida cases promulgated the policy of permitting federal
judicial resolution of original Indian title claims and stated that
defenses based upon "state adverse possession laws and state
statutes of limitations have been consistently rejected., 65 The
Oneida cases also stated, "we know of no principle of law that would
relate the availability of judicial relief inversely to the gravity of the
wrong sought to be redressed." 66
Thus, any argument by
Connecticut that the extraordinary ramifications of a judgment in
favor of the Tribe should warrant dismissal is misplaced.
In short, the 1765 dispossession of the Golden Hill
Paugussett's land has no bearing on the justiciability of the claim.
Original Indian title dates from time immemorial, not from 1789
or 1775.67 The United States necessarily incorporated British and
colonial common law into its body of law when the U.S.
Constitution was adopted in 1789. 68 Since property law was
governed by the common law, those persons that held legal title
under the common law of 1774 held that same legal title under the
common law of 1775. Those who had valid title to their land in
1788 retained valid legal title to those same lands in 1789. 69 As Part
III of this paper will argue, the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe had
legal title to the sixty-eight acres in 1659. Because legal title never
was validly taken or conveyed at any point thereafter, at the very
least, the question of whether the tribe ever was legally divested of
its original Indian title is a justiciable one. Judge Dorsey's
characterization of this case as a claim under the Proclamation of
64. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 597.
65. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State, 691 F.2d 1070, 1083 (2d Cir.
1982).
66. Id.
67. The Court's reasoning is especially problematic because the very nature
of original Indian title is that it predates the United States: "Indian title... refers
to the Indian tribes' aboriginal tide to land which predates the establishment of
the United States." Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528
F.2d 370, 376 n.6 (1st Cir. 1975). For the court to imply that original Indian title,
as protected by the United States, only dates from 1789 or 1775 is manifestly
improper.
68. See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 749 (1835).
69. See id. at 749 (holding that the "laws of a conquered or ceded country
remain in force till altered by the new sovereign"). For two cases in which
property rights under Mexican law were not altered by the Mexican Cession, see
United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1941); Barker v.
Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 486 (1901).
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1763 and not under American law is erroneous. ° If this simply was
a claim for damages based on a violation of a British proclamation,
the real estate market
Connecticut, would not have
•
• in Bridgeport,
71
been thrown into disarray, the state assembly may not have
attempted to strip the tribe of recognition, 2 and the state assembly
might not have attempted to pass a "blanket" ratification of all
73
previously invalid takings. In addition, certain Connecticut state
representatives may not have felt the need to refer to the Golden
Hill Paugussett's claims as the "terrorist activities of this so-called
tribe."74 The only threat, if this were not a claim of possession,
70. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 137-38 (D.
Conn. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Indians'LandSuits DragAlong, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Jan. 5, 1997,
at A2 (citing homeowner who says he is unable to sell his house).
72. See State Senate Votes To Strip Golden Hill Paugussetts Of Recognition Status,
THE HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 19, 1996, at A15.
73. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-33c (1993), as amended in Oct. Sp. Sess., S.A.
93-1:
All transfers of land more than sixty years prior to the effective date of
this act [Nov. 12, 1993] of any person or group or association of persons,
otherwise valid except for the possible fact that the general assembly or
its predecessor legislative bodies or other governmental authorities did
not confirm, validate, ratify or approve such transfers of land in
accordance with state or colonial laws or resolutions, common law or any
other provisions requiring legislative or governmental approval of
transfers of land held or occupied by any such person or group or
association of such persons, are hereby confirmed, validated, ratified and
approved. Nothing in this act shall be construed to imply that transfers
of such land were not confirmed, validated, ratified or approved prior to
the effective date of this act [Nov. 12, 1993] or that land claims based on
such transfers are valid or not barred by the provisions of chapter 821 of
the general statutes or other legal or equitable defenses.
Id.
The number of violations of federal Indian law in this statute is
astounding, and the fact that it is targeted specifically at the Golden Hill
Paugussett Tribe is thinly veiled. See Land Ownership Reaffirmed in Connecticut, S.F.
CHRONIcLE, Nov. 27, 1993, at A24. ("[W]e must, if we are to maintain our own
dignity and standards here, write this in the broadest manner applicable to all....
[I]t should not be discriminatory in nature. It should not be focused against one
group.") (comments of Rep. Richard Tulisano, the bill's sponsor in the House).
The most extraordinary statement came from Rep. Daniel Caruso, who noted, "All
land in that early period was considered 'held of the king'... thus 'the Indians
had nothing to sell.'" Id. This, in a manner of speaking, is exactly what the tribe is
arguing-if the tribe legally were able to sell the property in question in 1765
without the holder of the "fee" approving the sale, this case would be moot.
74. Jack Ewing, Bill to counteract Paugussett land claims passes; Bill to curb Indian
land claims passes, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 21, 1993, at BI (attributing the
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would be to the state treasury. Here, the tribe claims title to the
sixty-eight acres since time immemorial.
The district court does not suggest in its opinion that the tribe
failed to invoke jurisdiction15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)."
Rather, the court attempts to categorize the claim as falling outside
of the reach of section 1331.'r The district court erred by
obscuring the fact that Indian title to the land in question predated
discovery and that the tribe was suing under federal common law to
regain possession of the sixty-eight acres.7s
Numerous statutes passed since 1789, and particularly since
1934, indicate a federal policy-based interest in restoring and
protecting Indian title. 79 With regard to the legal effect of the
Proclamation of 1763, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted: "The
authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent,
has never been denied, and the titles it gave to lands have always
been sustained in our Courts."80 In any event, Oneida Indian Nation
and other cases explicitly state that no specific federal statute needs
to be cited by a tribe bringing a federal common-law claim of
original Indian title in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (a). 81
The tribe's claim was a federal common law claim asserting the
continued vitality of its original Indian title to the sixty-eight acres.
It should not have been dismissed.

quote to Rep. Dale Radcliffe).
75. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 136.

76.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1994).

77. See Weicker, 839 F. Supp. at 135-38.
78. See id. at 132, 137-38.
79. See, e.g., The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479(1994).
80. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597 (1823). Furthermore, that this suit
is a common-law property claim does not suggest that state court is the proper
forum for this lawsuit. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661, 666 (1974) (holding that "[a]ccepting the premise of the Court of Appeals
that the case was essentially a possessory action, we are of the view that the
complaint asserted a current right to possession conferred by federal law, wholly
independent of state law"). The courts have hardly questioned the federal
government's exclusive authority over Indian land since 1789. See Mohegan Tribe
v. State, 638 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that even if the states retained
fee tile to Indian lands after 1789, "this reality did not alter the doctrine that
federal law, treaties, and statutes protected Indian occupancy and that its
termination was exclusively the province of federal law" (quoting Oneida Indian
Nation, 414 U.S. at 670)).
81. See generally Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 661; Mohegan Tribe, 638 F.2d
at 612.
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C. Negative Implications ofJudge Dorsey's Opinion
Judge Dorsey's opinion has negative repercussions that exceed
its normative errors. The effect of the court's argument is that
original Indian title, which dates from time immemorial, no longer
is "as sacred as the fee simple of the whites. ", 82 The Proclamation of
1763 contained warrants to land for military personnel who were
active in the French and Indian War. Our courts recognize these
property rights created by the Proclamation.8 4 Original Indian title
protected by this Proclamation should be afforded no less
protection.
Also underlying Judge Dorsey's opinion is the notion that
original Indian title, which never was validly taken, can disappear
over the centuries under the "increasing weight of history."85
Although this may be reassuring to property owners in 2000, this
notion suggests that the passage of time will make our misdeeds go
away. In reality, ignoring a legally cognizable claim such as the
Golden Hill Paugussetts' effectuates a re-colonization of this tribe
within the legal system (as opposed to outside the legal system,
which was the manner in which the original misdeed was
816
perpetrated) .
Modern courts articulate a strong federal policy protecting
Indian land interests.87 A fundamental tenet of that policy is that
statutes of limitations and other equitable defenses are inapplicable
to claims of original Indian title. This is because the courts have
reasoned that the passage of time will not undo the wrongs
committed against the Indians centuries ago by virtue of fraud,
unfair dealing, etc.88
Here, the district court abdicated its
responsibility as an expositor of federal law and policy and failed to
provide American Indians with equal property rights.

82. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835).
83. See Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. 425, 427 (1799).
84. See id. at 456 (holding that an assignment from acquirer under the King's
Proclamation of 1763 obtained complete legal title to the property).
85. See generally Joseph William Singer, Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of
History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REv. 481 (1994) (arguing that
extinguishing Indian tide due to the "increasing weight of history" is based on a
vague notion of misrepresented precedent).
86. See id. at 481-85.
87. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text; see also Oneida Indian
Nation of NewYork v. State, 691 F.2d 1070, 1083 (2d Cir. 1982).
88. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-47
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III. CONNECTICUT BEARS THE INSURMOUNTABLE BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE TRIBE'S TITLE WAS VALIDLY EXTINGUISHED

A.

Initial Questions

An order of the General Court of Connecticut in 1659
reserved an eighty-acre parcel for the Golden Hill Paugussett
Tribe. s9 Even the validity of this General Court order can be
challenged. According to the discovery doctrine in Johnson, the
right of preemption or the right to negotiate for the purchase of
Indian land rests exclusively with the sovereign. 90 Admittedly, this
power could be delegated to royal governors or, as often was done
in the American colonies, to those granted the "fee" to expansive
tracts of land in the Americas.9 1 "The Crown, having conveyed the
fee title to land to the colonists by various charters and patents,
initially permitted the colonists to purchase and extinguish Indian
title, either individually or through the [American] colonies." 92
In the case of Connecticut, a charter was not promulgated
until 1662. 9' It appears that the initial settlements in Connecticut
were made either by individuals of, or• by
the authority of, the
94
Massachusetts Bay or Plymouth colonies.
Those colonies were
granted • the right• to• acquire
Indian
title
by
the
Crown only within
95
their chartered limits. Those colonies had no power to acquire or
purchase lands from the Indians outside of those limits since they
did not possess the "fee." 9 6 Rather, the fee title to the uncharted
lands remained in the Crown until 1662. 9' Thus, the confinement
of the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe to the eighty acres in
controversy was itself an act beyond the power of the General Court
of Connecticut. Nonetheless, this paper will assume, as has the
89. See 1 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 334, 335-36 (May 19, 1659) (Hartford, Brown
& Parsons 1850).
90. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823).
91.
See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State, 691 F.2d 1070, 1076 (2d
Cir. 1982).
92. Id.
93. See 1808 LAws, supranote 40.

94.

See 1808 LAws, supra note 40, at iv; see also BENJAMIN TRUMBULL, 1 THE
App. I (1818).
95. See 1808 LAws, supra note 40; see also James Warren Springer, American
Indians And The Law Of Real PropertyIn Colonial New England, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
25, 35-39 (1986).
96. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592-93 (1823).
97. See 1808 LAws, supra note 40 (recording the promulgation of
Connecticut's state charter).
HISTORY OF CONNEcricUT
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tribe, that the eighty acres granted to the Tribe in the 1659 order
were validly conveyed or reserved. Thus, either original Indian title
or recognized title was vested in the tribe.
Determining whether the eighty acres is either recognized or
original Indian title has little, if any, relevance. The essential
question is whether the State of Connecticut had the authority to
validly take the land in 1765. Arguably, if the title were recognized,
the State of Connecticut would have the additional burdens of the
law of eminent domain restricting its ability to take the land and
would be required to demonstrate that the land was being taken for
public use and that the tribe was fairly compensated. 9s
Likewise, all originalIndian title in the Colony of Connecticut
could be purchased only for public use according to an Order of
the General Court in 1663:
[N]o person in this Colony shall buy, hire, or [receive] as
a gift or mortgage, any parcel of land or lands of any
Indian or Indians, for the future, except he doe[s] buy or
[receive] the same for the use of the Colony or the
[benefit] of some Towne, with the allowance of the
Court.99

Moreover, prior to 1787, the common-law discovery doctrine
did not permit takings of original Indian title without
compensation absent military conquest.'00 Thus, the status of the
eighty acres as "recognized" or "original" Indian title made no
difference under the law in the eighteenth century. It is now
appropriate to examine if and how the Golden Hill Paugussetts
held title to the land in controversy from 1659 to the present.
B.

Status of the Title, 1659-1761
Historical accounts suggest that the eighty-acre parcel officially

98. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955), the Court
ruled that unlike recognized title, original Indian title was not property under the
Fifth Amendment and could be taken for public use without compensation. The
highly questionable logic of this opinion has been discussed at length. See Singer,
supra note 85, at 518-26.
99. 1 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 402 (May 14, 1663) (Hartford, Brown & Parsons
1850).
100. Ratification or extinguishment by express act was a legal principle not
developed until the mid- to late-nineteenth century. See United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 351 (1941).
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was taken in 1765,
-- 101 subsequent to the tribe's 1763 appeal to the
General Assembly.
Undoubtedly, this land was encroached upon
sometime around 1760.102 Therefore, it could be argued that the
physical taking of the land in question occurred prior to the
Proclamation of 1763. The state of Connecticut might argue that
the official events of 1765 were a mere formality, and that the
colony in fact disposed of the Tribe's title prior to 1763 at a time
when the colony had the power to do so. This argument can be
challenged in three ways.
First and foremost, the colony of Connecticut itself recognized
the invalid eviction in 1760 of the Golden Hill Paugussetts by nonIndians. The General Assembly determined that as to the taking of
the sixty-eight acres, it does "not approve" of the land being
"unjustly disseized. "''
Connecticut colonial law at the time
provided that (1) "no title to any lands in this Colony can accrue by

any purchase made of Indians on pretence of their being native
proprietors thereof, without the allowance or approbation of [the
General] Assembly"' 10 4 and, (2) that a:
defendant or tenant shall not be admitted to plead in his
[defense] that he hath holden the demandants out of the
land demanded for the space of fifteen years, or any ways
to take benefit by the law entitled An Act for the quieting
mens estates and avoiding of suits .... 0"
Thus, the title to the sixty-eight acres never was legally
transferred out of the tribe's possession at any time prior to the
Proclamation of 1763. At that point, it was beyond the authority of
the Assembly to take the Tribe's land.
101.

12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 340 (May 9, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &

Brainard Co. 1881).
102. See JOHN WILLIAM
CONNECTICUT

FROM

Hammersley 1851)

THE

DE FOREST, THE HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF
EARLIEST KNOWN PERIOD TO 1850 355 (Hartfort,

("[The Golden Hill Paugussett] enjoyed their reservations

peaceably until about 1760, when they were ejected by some of the neighboring
white proprietors who laid claim to all the land but about six acres, and enforced
their claims by pulling down the Indian wigwams.").
103. 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 340 (May 9, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881).
104. 6 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 368 (May 9, 1717) (Hartford, Case, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1872).
105. 7 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 72 (Oct. 13, 1726) (Hartford, Case, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1873).
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Second, it seems improper to suggest that the physical taking
occurred prior to 1761 and that the 1765 Act can be characterized
as a mere ratification rather than a taking of Indian title.
Eighteenth-century common law (as interpreted by the American
courts), including the law in 1760, permitted only the sovereign (or
holder of a delegated right of preemption) to extinguish original
Indian title by two means-purchase or conquest (i.e., not by
ratification).
In this case, the sovereign neither purchased the
land from the tribe nor took it by force. The land was illegally
seized by private individuals and then that seizure was ratified, post
hoc, by the colony. This mere ratification attempting to ratify a
prior taking by private individuals was invalid for extinguishing
original Indian title in the eighteenth century."'
The Commissioners of Review, who adjudicated the Mohegan
Land Controversy in 1743, held that the Mohegan Tribe had the
106.

See Clinton, supra note 30, at 334:

One of the earliest instances of active intervention by the Crown came in
1664, when King Charles II appointed a royal commission to investigate
complaints he had received from the Indians about colonial
mistreatment of their tribes. The following year, after due investigation,
the royal commissioners instructed colonial authorities that they could
not properly take Indian land by conquest unless that conquest was just
(i.e., defensive) and [unless] the land was within the scope of the
colonial charter. The royal commissioners further advised colonial
authorities that confiscation of Indian hunting lands and other
uncultivated areas as vacant waste was illegal, because "no doubt the
country is [the Indians'] till they give it or sell it, though it be not
improoued [sic]."
Id. This decree expressed a departure from the Lockean theory of vacuum
domicilium, which is articulated in EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 161
(1796) (the first American printing). De Vattel stated,
[w] e have already observed in establishing the obligation to cultivate the
earth that these nations cannot exclusively appropriate to themselves
more land than they have occasion for, and which they are unable to
settle and cultivate. Their removing their habitations through these
immense regions cannot be taken for a true and legal possession.
Id. However, De Vattel went on to note that "we cannot help praising the
moderation of the English Puritans who first settled New England; who, not
withstanding their being furnished with a charter from their sovereign, purchased
of the Indians the land they resolved to cultivate." Id.
107. See DE FoREsT supra note 102, at 355 ("[The Golden Hill Paugussett]
enjoyed their reservations peaceably until about 1760, when they were ejected by
some of the neighboring white proprietors who laid claim to all the land but about
six acres, and enforced their claims by pulling down the Indian wigwams.").
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"property of the soil. ' ' 8 The "laws of nature or nations" governed
these rights such that the land could only be taken through a "fair
and honest purchase."10 9
The common-law discovery doctrine permitted takings of
Indian title only by purchase or conquest. Neither purchase nor
conquest by the colony occurred when the property was taken by
private individuals in 1760. The colonial assemblies lost these two
exclusive means of extinguishing title in 1763."'
Third, the unique nature of the 1662 Connecticut charter
granted fee title to individuals who had (rightly or wrongly) already
settled in the area and purchased, or acquired by conquest, the
Indians' right to occupy all the land therein except such land
explicitly reserved to the Indians."' The colony reserved the eightyacre parcel for the tribe prior to the Charter. It is reasonable to
deduce, therefore, that based on the charter's language, the King
merely granted fee title to those lands already purchased or
acquired by conquest. Accordingly, the eighty-acre parcel possibly
was not intended to be included in the royal grant-i.e., it was
explicitly reserved, unlike the other land purchased
by individuals
2
whose sovereign authority was questionable.
Language contained in Johnson supports this assertion: "So far
as respected the authority of the crown, no distinction was taken
between vacant lands and lands occupied by the Indians.""' 3 In
addition,
[T]he establishment of a regal government has never
been considered as impairing [the crown's] right to grant
lands within the chartered limits of such colony. In
addition to the proof of this principle, furnished by the
108. SeeJames W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the
Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 55, 65 (1997).
109. See PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF REVIEW, supra note 36.
110. See Clinton, supra note 30, at 356-57 (explaining the effect of the
Proclamation of 1763).
111. See 1808 LAWS, supra note 40.
112. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 602 (1823) (discussing the
settlement of Connecticut and Rhode Island and noting that "religious
dissentions" were settled outside the chartered limit of Massachusetts and lands
were purchased from Indians at a time when "there were none to assert title of the
crown." The court held that Connecticut's 1662 charter was indispensable to
complete title since the acquisitions were "previous unauthorized purchase[s]").
The opinion in Johnson implies that the only purpose of the 1662 charter was to
confirm previous unauthorized acquisitions.
113. Id. at 596.
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immense grants, already mentioned, of lands lying within
the chartered limits of Virginia, the continuing right of
the crown to grant
lands lying within that colony was
4
always admitted.''

A natural interpretation here is that the "fee" to all lands
within the chartered limits of a colony that were left vacant or
reserved to the Indians reverted to the Crown in 1662. Thus, the
Connecticut charter may not have granted the colony the fee to the
eighty-acre parcel and it never may have been within the state's
power to extinguish Indian occupancy regardless of the royal
prerogatives passed between 1761 and 1763.
C. Status of the Title, 1761-1765
On December 2, 1761, the Board of Trade issued a "general
order... to the governors in the royal colonies that forbade [the
governors] to issue grants to any Indian lands."" 6 That order was
114. Id. at 595-96.
115. See id. at 596 ("The title, subject only to the right of occupancy by the
Indians, was admitted to be in the king, as was his right to grant that tide.").
116. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 22 (1984). However, the
governors to whom it was directed did not include the governor of Connecticut.
Thus, Connecticut could have argued that the Board of Trade Instructions did not
apply to it and that, since the policy behind those instructions went into the
Proclamation of 1763, the Proclamation did not apply to them either.
In response, it should be noted first that the Proclamation contained no
such jurisdictional restriction. Thus, if the Board of Trade made an explicit
restriction in its Instructions, it would follow that the King would have done the
same in his decree. His omission of that restriction indicates his intent to not limit
the Proclamation's reach.
Secondly, the fact that the Instructions were not forwarded to certain
governors does not mean that their respective colonies were exempt from the
policy. In fact, Pennsylvania was not included in the Board's Instruction, yet the
Board advised them in 1726 that the state was "forbidden to make grants of land
within [its] own undisputed boundaries, if such lands were included in an Indian
reservation created by treaty."
OLIVER M. DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL
GOVERNMENT 1696-1765 343 (1962). According to Dickerson, it was the Board of
Trade that ordered the Commission in the Mohegan Case. See id. That same
Commission held that, unless there was a "fair and honest purchase" of the
Indians' right of occupancy, the king could step in on behalf of the tribe. Also,
the Commission had the power to order tenants off Indian lands because it found
that these tenants deeded their land away prior to the 1662 charter and that the

charter ratified this conveyance.
REviEW, supra note 36, at 127.

See

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF

In sum, such was not the case with the Paugussetts, and it could be
argued, therefore, that even earlier than 1761, the Connecticut Assembly did not
have unfettered discretion to dispose of Indian lands. Furthermore, most writers
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not limited geographically and prohibited grants of Indian lands
"at any time reserved to or claimed by [the Indians] .'7 The order s
has been viewed as the predecessor of the Proclamation of 1763. 18
The language of the order supports the theory that the
Proclamation's moratorium on colonial control of Indian title
negotiations was intended to apply throughout the colonies. 9
On October 7, 1963, the Proclamation was issued describing
Indian territory as well as "any other lands.., not having been
ceded to or purchased by us, are still reserved to the said
Indians. " "2 It also referred to "any lands reserved to said Indians
within those parts of our colonies where we have thought proper to
allow settlement."12 1 The Proclamation forbade any purchase of
Indian title to these lands unless purchased in the Crown's name at
a public meeting of the tribe held by the "governor or commander
in chief' of the colony.
The Proclamation applied to Indian
lands east of the colonial boundaries established by the
Proclamation.

121

After determining in May 1765 that the original Indian title to
the dispossessed sixty-eight acres was not validly acquired, 1 a the
Connecticut General Assembly declared that a settlement had been
reached.125 The Assembly determined that thirty bushels of corn,
three pounds of blankets and an additional eight acres of land
satisfied "in full of all demands and in full satisfaction of all claims
of or to all and any lands there to be hereafter made by them or
referring to the Board of Trade report either implicitly or explicitly state that it
applied to all colonies.
117. See Clinton, supra note 30, at 354.
118. See id. at 355.
119. See id. at 356-57.
120. Id. at 384.
121. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 384.
123. See Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 616 (1st Cir. 1981)
(clarifying that the Continental Congress' policy in 1783 "affirmed the prior policy
of the Royal Proclamation of 1763... but it limited the effect of the Resolve [of
1743] to lands 'without the limits of jurisdiction' of the states"); see also Clinton,
supra note 33, at 1091 ("Thus, even for lands eastward of the Indian country
boundary, i.e., lands clearly lying within domains claimed for settlement by
colonial charter, the Proclamation centralized the process of securing Indian land
sessions [sic] by handing that responsibility to officials appointed by and
answerable to London.").
124. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 367-68 (May 9, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881) (acknowledging that the land was unjustly deseized).
125. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 433 (Oct. 10, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881).
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their successors.', 6 In this the Indians supposedly "declared their
twenty acres.
consent and willingness" to reside on the remaining
This resolution was not passed in the presence of the Indians, but
instead was based upon the report of a committee sent out by the
118
Assembly to investigate the matter in May 1765.
The land was not
purchased in the Crown's name, nor was it purchased at a public
meeting of the tribe held by the colonial governor. 12 9 Thus, the
purchase was in direct contravention
to both the Proclamation and
S
130
the order of the Board of Trade.
Again, while the Proclamation
and its predecessor may have been both unpopular and ignored,
the simple fact remains that the Indian title to the sixty-eight acres
never was validly extinguished in 1765 according to the legal
procedures existing at that time.'
Under the common law of
1765, particularly the discovery doctrine and the Proclamation, the
Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe never was divested of its original
Indian title to the sixty-eight acres.12
Moreover, the compensation given the tribe, approved by the
tribe's so-called trustee, hardly was indicative of a "fair and honest
,,133
purchase,
especially since the white "squatters" took the land in
1760 by "pulling down the Indian wigwams." 13 4 Even the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,135 recognized
that most of these
acquisitions of Indian title were not really
1 6
3
purchases at all.
126. 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 432-33 (Oct. 10, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881).
127. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 433 (Oct. 10, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881).
128. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 367-68 (May 9, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood &
Brainard Co. 1881).
129. See 12 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 432-33 (Oct. 10, 1765) (Hartford, Lockwood
& Brainard Co. 1881).
130. See Clinton, supra note 30, at 354-58.
131. See PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF REVIEW, supra note 36;
COMMAGER, supra note 9, at 47-50.
132. Seejohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 594-97 (1823).
133. See PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF REVIEW, supranote 36.
134. See DE FOREST, supranote 102, at 355.
135. 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955).
136. See id. The court stated, "[e]ven when the Indians ceded millions of acres
by treaty in return for blankets, food, and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conquerors' will that deprived them of their land." Id. Curiously, if one accepts
the argument that the eighteenth-century procedure for title extinguishment
required purchase of Indian lands, then Tee-Hit-Ton, a dreadful case for Indian
rights, can be read as stating that almost all takings of Indian title in the
eighteenth century were invalid.
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According to twentieth-century federal courts, any delegation
of the right of preemption to the colonies was revoked in 1763:137
The Crown, having conveyed the fee title to land to the
colonists by various charters and patents, initially
permitted the colonists to purchase and extinguish Indian
title, either individually or through the colonies. Many of
the colonies, in order to minimize disputes with the
Indians, enacted laws requiring colonial approval for
individually negotiated land cessions. Unauthorized and
unrestricted encroachments on Indian lands continued,
however, and the Crown recognized the need to devise
plans for a comprehensive and uniform Indian policy....
The efforts of the Crown culminated in the issuance of
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which forbade the
purchase or settlement of Indian lands by anyone,
including the
colonial governors, without permission of
38
the Crown.
Therefore, as a matter of British law, which American courts
subsequently adopted, 39 the colony of Connecticut did not have
the power or authority to extinguish, in any way, the Golden Hill
Paugussett's original title in October 1765.140

Moreover, under the colony's own laws, the colony was not
authorized to settle a property dispute between Indians and
colonists by granting a large portion of the disputed territory to
private individuals.
As previously noted, the 1663 order forbade
137. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. State, 691 F.2d 1070, 1076 (2d
Cir. 1982).
138. Id.; see also Clinton, supra note 33, at 1066-67 ("While primary
responsibility for the management of British-Indian relations was left to local
authorities, the Board of Trade in London always reserved the right of oversight
for the Crown.").
139. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597 (1823) (stating that the
authority of the Proclamation of 1763 has always been respected in the United
States, and that the titles it gave to lands have always been sustained in the United
States' courts).
140. See id. at 594-97.
141. See Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Conn., Inc. v. Potter, 587 A.2d 139, 146
(1991) (stating that a 1717 act of the Connecticut legislature, "An Act for WellOrdering and Governing the Indians in this State and Securing Their Interest,"
prohibited individual land transactions with Indians and required state approval
for land sales between Indians and European colonists). The individuals who
encroached on the 68 acres prior to 1765 undoubtedly were private individuals.
See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Town of Southbury, 651 A.2d 1246,
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the purchase of any Indian land unless the purchase was for the
"use of the Colony or the benefit of some Towne." 4M Also, the
colonial court ordered in 1680 that the Tribe's land "shall be
recorded to them and the same shall [remain] to them and their
heirs for ever; and it shall not be in the power of any such Indian or
Indians to make any alienations thereof .. ..

A letter from

Colonel Robert Treat, referring to the 1680 order, contained the
following passage:
At a General Court, May the 13th 1680, [the Paugussett
Indians] made application to the said Court showing the
commodiousness of those lands for their living, by fishing
hunting, et. cet., and they were afraid lest it should be
disposed from them to the inurie of them and theirs, did
by their agents for the wholl companie petition that their
hands might be tied and not sell their rights in that lands
and the consideration of it, with others like minded,
occasioned an order that what lands is reserved or set
apart for anie Indians shall be recorded to them, and it
shall not be I the power of anie Indian or Indians to make
any alienation thereof.' 44
Thus, not only was the "agreement" of 1765 invalid as a matter
of British common law, 45 it also was invalid under the common law
of colonial Connecticut. This common law remained unaltered
until the state adopted a state constitution sometime after 1808' 46 1248 (Conn. 1995).
142. See 1 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 402 (May 14, 1663) (Hartford, Brown &

Parsons 1850).
143. 3 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 57 (May 13, 1680) (Hartford, Case, Lockwood &
Co. 1859) (specifically addressing the situation of the Golden Hill Paugussetts in
1680).
144. 3 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 444 (May 23, 1688) (Hartford, Case, Lockwood &
Co. 1859).
145. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597 (1823).
146. See 1808 LAws, supra note 40, at 389. Compiled before the drafting of the
Connecticut Constitution, the section pertaining to Indians contains, unaltered
and unamended, the General Court orders (a) restricting sale to Indians unless
for the use of the state and with the approval of the Assembly (3 Pub. Rec. Col.
Conn. 56-57 (1680)); (b) the order standing that no interest in property taken in
violation of the 1680 order shall accrue and that treble damages will be paid (id.);
and (c) the order prohibiting the use of adverse possession and time-bar defenses
(7 Pub. Rec. Col. Conn. 72 (1726)). Thus, as will be relevant later, there was no
meaningful change in the law of Connecticut as to Indian lands from 1726 to

1808.
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long after Connecticut lost 47 the sovereign right of preemption

under the U.S. Constitution.
Johnson v. MIntosh14 1 illustrates the effect of the prevailing
common law on pre-17 7 5 purchases of Indian title. Johnson held
that a pre-Independence purchase of Indian land by someone not
holding the "fee" was invalid under the prevailing law. 14 Justice
Marshall explicitly rejected plaintiffs' contention
[t]hat the proclamation of 1763 could not restrain the
purchasers under these deeds from purchasing; because
the lands lay within the limits of the colony of Virginia,...
[a] nd because the king had not, within the limits of that
colonial government, or any other, any power of
prerogative legislation.
Mitchel v. United States15" articulates that our courts, when
construing pre-constitutional property rights, should be guided by
the law of the previous sovereign. 5 2 The property rights of the
Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe originated under the law of Great
Britain and the Colony of Connecticut, and those rights never were
legally extinguished.
D. Status of the Title, 1775-1789
1.

American Independence

The inception of American independence in 1775 is the next
147. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3; County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) ("With the adoption of the Constitution,
Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law."); Clinton, supra
note 33, at 1164 ("Perhaps the most important marginal contribution of the
Indian Commerce Clause was to limit state authority.").
148. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
149. See id. at 604.
150. Id. at 564; see also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746-47 (1835).
151. 34 U.S. 711 (1835).
152. See id. at 737 (holding that adjudications of property rights arising in
Florida (before that state was admitted to the Union) must be "in conformity to
the principles of justice and the laws and ordinances of the government under
which the claim of the petitioner originated"). An excellent case paralleling the
Paugussetts' claim is Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (D. Penn.
1795) (holding as a matter of post-1789 American law that a deed from Indians in
1754 was invalid because it was not executed "in that open, public, national
manner, in which the Indians sell and transfer their lands").
153. See Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 737.
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date relevant to the vitality of the Golden Hill Paugussett's land
claims.
While it is undisputed that the British Crown and
Parliament's authority over the colonies ceased as of 1775, the
questions posed by this case are: (1) what happened to the
prevailing common law; and (2) what happened to the right of
preemption?
At the moment the American Revolution started, it is doubtful
that there was any change in existing property rights. Invalid
conveyances by tribes, as in Johnson, were not rendered valid at
whatever magical moment the British government's status as the
ruling sovereign ceased. This practical rule-that property rights,
particularly Indian title, cannot be extinguished by implied
ratification-has been strongly adhered to by federal courts for at
least fifty years. 54 In fact, the court in Mitchel v. United States held
that:
[B]y the law of nations, the inhabitants, citizens, or
subjects of a conquered or ceded territory, or province,
retain all the rights of property which have not been taken
from them by the orders of the conqueror, or the laws of
the sovereign who acquires it by cession, and remain
5
under their former laws until they shall be changed. 1
American independence did not alter the Golden Hill
Paugussett's ownership of the sixty-eight acres, nor did it alter the
legal procedure by which Indian title could be extinguished at
common law.
2.

After 1775 and Before 1789

The next relevant question is: Who became the sovereign in
1775 and assumed the right of preemption reacquired by the King
of England in 1763?

In Oneida Indian Nation,

the court stated:

The perceived need for a national Indian policy was
shared by the colonists, resulting in the creation of certain
154. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941)
("[A]n extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude
of the Federal Government for the welfare of its Indian wards.").
155. Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 733.
156. Oneida Indian Nation v. State, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982).
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federal administrative mechanisms even prior to the
adoption

of

the

Articles

of

Confederation....

In

establishing these departments, the Continental Congress
was "exercising definite governmental power for all the
colonies [and] declared its jurisdiction over Indian
tribes."'57
It appears doubtful that the right of preemption could have
vested in the state of Connecticut until the adoption of the Articles
of Confederation in 1781.
The language of Article IX states:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have
the sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating
the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not
members of any of the States, provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated .... "'
This passage has been understood to mean that each state
assumed power over the Indian tribes and the lands within the
16
states borders." 5 The Proclamation of 1783 confirms this. 0
However, even though it appears that the right of preemption
vested in Connecticut at this time,161it did not change the legal
procedure for acquiring Indian title.
Connecticut might argue that it extinguished the tribe's title
between 1781 and 1789, when the state had the power to do so.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, under the yet-unaltered
common-law-discovery doctrine, the proper procedure for
16
extinguishing Indian tile still was by purchase or conquest. 1
Therefore, the state of Connecticut would have had to renegotiate
the illegal purchase in 1765 of the sixty-eight acres when it
inherited the mantle of "sovereign owner of the fee title" to Indian
lands. 163 An act extinguishing the Indian right of occupancy or
157.

Id. at 1076 (quoting F.

COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

9

(1942)).
158.

U.S. Articles of Confederation, art. IX, reprinted in THE GREAT BooKS

OF

at 5 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (1781).
See Clinton, supra note 33, at 1103-04.
See id. at 1107-08.
See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 734 (1835).
SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823).
The current Connecticut Assembly has implied renegotiation never

THE WESTERN WORLD,

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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simply ratifying the invalid purchase would have been insufficient
under the prevailing common law,' 64 just as the purchase by
Connecticut in 1765 failed to adhere to common law procedure.161
Express ratification of the invalid taking (e.g., an act of
extinguishment) by the independent state would be unavailing for
a second reason. Our courts have acknowledged that a legislature
166
cannot simply cure an illegal action by subsequent ratification.
Due process unlikely would be satisfied if Congress seized an
individual's house illegally for private use and Congress
subsequently passed an act stating that its action was legal. Even if
Congress changed the law of eminent domain in this hypothetical
so that its action would be legal under the new law, due process
would require that Congress reinitiate a taking under the new
procedure to legally obtain the house.
Accordingly, had the state of Connecticut ratified the invalid
taking (and/or extinguished the Indian title by express act)
between 1781 and 1789-when only the state had the power to
extinguish Indian title by purchase or conquest-its action would
not satisfy due process as presently interpreted. 16 The state of
Connecticut could have passed a law during this period, altering
the common law doctrine (which then required that Indian title be
purchased) so that the state, as sovereign, would have the new
power of extinguishing Indian title by express act without
compensation. No indication of any such alteration exists in

happened. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-33c (1993), as amended in Oct. Sp.
Sess., S.A. 93-1.
164. See PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF REVIEW, supra note 36, at 126;
Clinton, supra note 30, at 335-36. The idea that the original Indian title can be

extinguished by express act, was seemingly first articulated in the Santa Fe case,
which cited late nineteenth-century cases as support. See United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). The premise behind Congress' ability to
extinguish original title by express act has been that the Indian tribes are an
"ignorant and dependent race." See Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877);
cf United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1886). In addition to the fact
that this logic and mode of thinking has been heavily criticized, in the late 1700s
there was an overwhelming number of powerful tribes which were not, by any
means, "dependent," let alone ignorant. See generally Singer, supranote 85.
165.
See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
166.
See SantaFe, 314 U.S. at 347 (suggesting that the right of occupancy would
remain with the Indians because their rights were "not extinguished; nor was the
policy of respecting such Indian title changed").
This implies that for an
improper taking of Indian land to become valid title, the procedure must change, or
the taking remains invalid.
167.
SeeJohnson, 21 U.S. at 594-97.
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Connecticut law governing Indian lands.' 6 Also, no evidence of an
act passed pursuant to such a hypothetical new law extinguishing
the Paugussett's title exists. Such a change in the law and the
subsequent retaking of the Paugussett's land would be an
acknowledgment of the invalidity of the original taking, and
perhaps entitle the tribe to, at the very least, trespass damages from
1765 until the
state hypothetically
•
169 could have changed its law
sometime between 1781 and 1789.
As aforementioned, the prevailing law of Connecticut as to
Indian title acquisition, as well as the British common law and
discovery doctrine, remained unaltered from 1726 until 1808. The
laws of the "new sovereign" Connecticut as of 1808 indicate that the
state did not "change" the discovery doctrine requiring purchase or
conquest (and not permitting extinguishment)
from 1781 until it
70
ceded sovereignty to federal authorities.1
3.

1789 and Beyond

Since 1789, when the U.S. Constitution took effect, the federal
government's exclusive control over Indian titles rarely, if ever, has
been challenged by the courts. 171 Any right of preemption that the
American people, as the sovereign, may have had under the
Articles of Confederation was transferred to the federal
government, particularly Congress, in 1789. As Johnson implied,
the ratification of the Constitution did not validate the invalid
colonial act of 1765.17' Furthermore, because takings of Indian title
under American law must be express and not implied, Connecticut
cannot assert that a taking occurred by implied ratification in
1789.173

168. See 1808 LAws, supranote 40, at 389.
169. But see United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1135-38 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that since original Indian title is not a compensable property
right, it does not create a damages remedy for trespass). The logic of this case may
well be undermined by the policy articulated in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. 371 (1980); and, it is possible, as noted above, to characterize this land as
"recognized" Indian title.
170. See 1808 LAws, supranote 40.
171. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3; County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985) ("With the adoption of the Constitution,
Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law."); Clinton, supra
note 33, at 1165 ("Perhaps the most important marginal contribution of the
Indian Commerce Clause was to limit state authority.").
172. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 604-05 (1823).
173. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941)
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The continuity of the Paugussett's title to this land could have
been interrupted after 1789 only if Congress expressly extinguished
the Golden Hill Tribe's title at a time when U.S. courts recognized
Congress's ability to exercise this plenary authority, i.e., after
1877.174 Even in such a circumstance, the tribe might be entitled to
damages from 1765 until legal taking of the title. That amount
could be much more than the state of Connecticut's cost to reach
some form of negotiated settlement granting the Bridgeport land
to the tribe.
E. Learningfrom the Past
In sum, under the common law of 1765, as shaped by the
colonial laws of Connecticut and a legitimate executive order of the
British king, the colony of Connecticut did not have the power to
purchase, for three pounds of blankets and thirty bushel of corn,
sixty-eight acres of the Golden Hill Paugussett reservation from the
Paugussett tribe for the use of private individuals. Nor could the
colony ratify, post hoc, by legislative act, the illegal 1760 taking by
private individuals. The tribe's right of occupancy was not
extinguished in 1765. Federal common law dictates that adverse
possession and state time-bar laws have no bearing on original
Indian title. 175 Accordingly, defendants have the burden of
demonstrating that some event subsequent to 1765 deprived the
tribe of its right to occupy the sixty-eight acres.176 Such an "event"
would have to have been a repurchaseby the sovereign as holder of
the right of preemption until the [lenary power doctrine was
created in the late nineteenth century.
The sovereign from 1765 until 1775 was the British king. No
evidence exists to suggest that he renegotiated a purchase of the
sixty-eight acres. The power to rid the Paugussett of its title from
("[A] n extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude
of the Federal Government for the welfare of its Indian wards.").
174. See id.; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); cf.United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1886).
175. See Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 241 n.13
(1985) ("Under the Supremacy Clause, state-law time bars, e.g., adverse possession
and laches, do not apply of their own force to Indian land title claims.").
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1994) (placing the burden of proof on the "white
person" in land trials where an Indian is a party).
177. The only exception would be if the prevailing common law of Indian title
acquisition was changed, which to all indications it was not as of 1808 in
Connecticut, and arguably not in the federal sphere until 1877.
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1775 to 1781 rested in the hands of the Continental Congress. 178
Connecticut has produced no evidence to suggest that a
repurchase was executed during this period. Likewise, no evidence
exists of a repurchase during the eight-year period (1781-1789) in
which the state ostensibly had the authority to do so.
Connecticut did not change the legal procedure during those
eight years to enable the state to evict the tribe from its land
without purchasing or conquering it. Even if such a change were
effectuated, altering a legal procedure with the express purpose of
validating a past wrong would be suspect and might lead to a claim
for damages. Modern courts would disfavor an implied taking
since post-1877 federal policy dictates that title must be
extinguished by express act and that ambiguities are to be
construed in favor of Indians. 179 This policy attempts to cure
inequalities and eliminate abuses of the past.18'
Incredibly, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a law to
ratify all previous invalid takings in 1993."' Although the language
of that law attempted to mask that it was specifically directed at an
Indian tribe, certain members of the General Assembly have been
less discreet in their opinions. 182 A measure to strip the tribe of
state recognition passed in the Connecticut Assembly but failed in
the Senate. These actions imply not only a tacit acknowledgement
that title never was rightfully taken from the tribe, but also indicate
animosity toward Indians and their unique form of land ownership
which, at one time, was as "sacred as the fee simple of the whites."',8
Judge Dorsey's opinion, Judge Morse's opinion in the Abenaki
case and Representative Radcliffe's comments on the floor of the
Connecticut Assembly fail to respect this unique form of
ownership 185 and herald a return to the tragedy of eighteenth- and
178.
179.

See Clinton, supra note 33, at 1142.
See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237,

270 (1985).
180. See id. at 278.
181.

See Conn. Oct. Sp. Sess., S.A. 93-1, eff. Nov. 12, 1993.

182.

See Bill to Counteract Paugussett Land Claims Passes,

THE HARTFORD

Oct. 21, 1993, at BI (quoting legislators who expressed concern and
acknowledged that the law was enacted with the express purpose of affecting
Indian land claims before the courts).
183. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835).
184. See generally Singer, supra note 85.
185. See Jack Ewing, Bill to Counteract Paugussett Land Claims Passes, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 21, 1993, at BI (quoting Radcliffe as saying "the terrorist
activities of this so-called tribe" in reference to the Paugussetts).
CouRANT,
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nineteenth-century illegal takings of Indian lands. Such a reconquest by a failure to properly apply the discovery doctrine and
other principles of federal Indian law would be unfortunate. That
Indian tribes' so-called "dependent" status affords them fewer
constitutional protections than non-Indians is racist and is a
prospect that must be discarded.
Misapplication of the discovery doctrine as a source for the
"dependency" myth gave rise to the concept of Congressional
plenary power over Indian affairs in the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-centuries, when those concepts were necessary to legalize
the allotment policy. 18 6 In 1955, these theories were further
mutated-by a court faced with the prospect of billion-dollar
interest judgments for takings of original Indian title-to support
the argument that an unrecognized Indian right of occupancy is
not "property" worthy of just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 8 7 In 1978, the Rehnquist court considered whether
the Suquamish Tribe could have criminal-law-enforcement
authority over non-Indians on its reservation."88 The court held
the
that the "diminished sovereign" status of Indian tribes,
189
.. . since
time of Johnson, precluded the tribe from such jurisdiction. This
practice of using the discovery doctrine articulated in Johnson as a
vehicle for diminishing Indian rights because of a fictional notion
of dependency must end.
Given its history, how does this system of colonizing law so
potently imposed on the Indian by the United States-this
White Man's Indian Law-manage to transcend the
genocidal and ethnocidal threat it has historically posed
to the perpetuation of Indian cultural identity, existence,
How can such a
and sovereignty in this country?
unilaterally imposed system of colonizing law and power
ever manage to assist Indian peoples in their struggles for

186. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903) (noting that
Congress possessed full administrative power over Indian tribal lands and refused
judicial review of legislative intent).
187. See generally, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955)
(denying Indian claims for timber taken by the U.S. Government from Indian
lands).
188. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1 (1978)
(noting that the reservation was one where the Indians comprised only a tiny
percent of the total population).
189. See id. at 209.
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cultural survival and achieve justice?' 90
IV. CONCLUSION

It was unfortunate but not fatal to the Paugussett tribe's claim
to the sixty-eight acres that the tribe did not appeal Judge Dorsey's
decision regarding the Proclamation of 1763. He explicitly stated
that this claim fell outside the scope
28 U.S.C. section 1331 (a)
• .. . of 191
and lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Essentially, the court
ruled that it had no subject matter jurisdiction arising from the
Proclamation of 1763. 92
While this ruling would preclude
relitigation on that specific issue, it would not have res judicata
effect on the merits of the tribe's federal common-law claim. "[A]
court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is given preclusive effect on
the issue of jurisdiction, even though it does not touch the merits
of the plaintiff's cause of action.
Once the administrative
proceedings pending with the BIA are exhausted or the tribe
appeals the dismissal of the claim regarding twelve acres, the tribe
will be precluded from reasserting a claim directly under the
Proclamation of 1763. The tribe would not be precluded, however,
from amending its complaint to contain a federal common-law
claim, particularly in light of the long-standing federal policy
against dismissing Indian land claims on procedural grounds.
Should the tribe get the opportunity to relitigate, and were it
to prevail, it undoubtedly would create further uproar. However, a
resolution favorable to both sides can be attained respecting both
sides' "property rights" in the land in question.1 4 All sides appear
to have disregarded this fact. In my estimation, the colony and
later the state of Connecticut, bear the greatest responsibility in
this case. Accordingly, a reasonable settlement might be as follows:
Connecticut could purchase land for the tribe in Bridgeport from
those owners willing to sell (at whatever price), and permit the
tribe to operate a casino (which the tribe admits it intends to do)
190. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The People Of The States Where They Are Found Are
Often Their Deadliest Enemies: The Indian Side Of The Story Of Indian Rights And
Federalism,38 ARIz. L. REv. 981, 986-87 (1996).
191. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp 130,
136-37 (D. Conn 1993).
192. See id. at 139.
193. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.7, at 668 (3d ed. 1999).
194. See Singer, supra note 85, at 530-31 (explaining that the United States
could have entered into a treaty with the Abenaki Indians, thus respecting the
property fights of both parties).
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on the purchased property with a portion of the profits going to
the state treasury to cover the difference between the aggregate
'just compensation" value of the properties purchased and the
actual aggregate sale price paid to landowners who received
whatever price they wanted.
Under this settlement, (1) the state is not heavily penalized for
its past wrongdoings; (2) the state economically benefits from
enhanced tax revenues; (3) current property owners are not forced
off their lands without what they subjectively would consider to be
inadequate compensation; (4) the tribe pays only for the enhanced
land value due to the prospect of a casino; and (5) the federal
court litigation ends, eliminating further chaos in the real estate
market. The state of Connecticut seems to peacefully coexist with
the casinos of, inter alia, the Mashantucket Pequots and the
Mohegans. Moreover, the Bridgeport City Council unanimously
supports the prospect of building a casino in the city.19 5

Their

wishes should be acknowledged.
This is but one solution that could successfully protect the
state's interests, the individual property owners' interests and, after
two-and-a-half centuries, the Golden Hill Paugussett Indians' sacred
right to occupancy.

195. Tribal Casino Gaining Support, THE LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 22,
2000, at ID.
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